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Abstract 
Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information while 
trading in their company's stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link in-
sider transactions to aformal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent 
releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a 
group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most 
active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent 
front -running transactions. 
Keywords: insider trading, inside information, §15a WpHG, German stock market, regulation of .financial 
markets 
Manuscript received July 13, 2007, accepted by Christian Schlag (Finance) May 6, 2008. 
1. Introduction 
The question whether corporate insiders exploit 
inside information while trading in their company's 
stock attracts the attention of academia and the 
public alike.1 Moreover, the answer to this question 
is also crucial for regulatory authorities, since on a 
capital market there is a loser for each winner. In 
particular, if corporate insiders exploit inside infor-
mation, profits received by corporate insiders re-
duce the returns of all other uniformed traders (in-
cluding the market maker).2 As a consequence, un-
1 In 2005, according to its annual report, the German regula-
tory authmity Bundesanstalt for Finanzdienstleistungsauf-
sicht (BaFin) investigated 54 cases related to suspected insider 
trading. E.g., several managers at DaimlerChrysler were sus-
pected to exploit inside information prior to the resignation of 
the former CEO Jiirgen Schrempp (Handelsblatt, August 29, 
2005). However, the probably most prominent suspicion was 
about the former Co-CEO of the European Aeronautic Defence 
and Space Company (EADS), Noel Forgeard, who sold to-
gether with his children stocks and stock options for a seven 
digit profit just a few weeks before EADS disclosed severe 
difficulties in the production of the airplane A38o (Handels-
blatt, June 21, 2006). 
2 Admittedly, this discussion highlights the disadvantages of 
insider trading exclusively and thus gives an incomplete pictu-
re. The reader should be aware that there exists a large body of 
informed investors might refrain from trading on 
the capital market. Thus, a well developed capital 
market requires an effective insider regulation to 
protect uninformed investors. In order to analyze 
the effectiveness of insider trading regulations in 
Germany, our study basically addresses three ques-
tions. First, we analyze whether German corporate 
insiders earn abnormal profits while trading in their 
company's stock. Second, we use a distinct property 
of German law, i.e., the companies' obligation to 
reveal inside information through ad-hoc news dis-
closures, to examine whether profits realized by 
corporate insiders seem to be due to the exploitation 
of inside information or not. Finally, we explore 
which group of insiders seems to be most active in 
trading on inside information: the one which is best 
informed about a company's prospects (i.e., senior 
managers) or the one which is probably least closely 
watched by the regulator (i.e., family members of 
senior managers and directors). Today, insider 
literature which emphasizes the beneficial role of insider 
trading. E.g. , Manove (1989) and Leland (1992) favor the 
permission of insider trading to increase informational effi-
ciency of security prices. 
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regulations prohibit the exploitation of inside in-
formation on capital markets in nearly all developed 
countries.3 In Germany, since 1994 § 14 WpHG 
(Security Trading Act) prohibits the exploitation 
and transmission of inside information. According 
to German law, inside information can be described 
as any specific information which is not subject to 
public knowledge and which, if it became publicly 
known, would likely have a significant effect on the 
stock price of the respective company (§ 13 WpHG). 
Moreover, to enhance market efficiency and to 
avoid information asymmetry § 15 WpHG requires 
an immediate public disclosure (ad-hoc announce-
ment) of any inside information (as defined in § 13 
WpHG) by the respective company. Additionally, as 
corporate insiders (i.e., senior managers, directors 
and their family members) may possess superior 
information about the company, since July 1, 2002 
§ 15a WpHG requires companies to report corporate 
insiders' transactions to the public as well as to the 
regulatory authority, the Bundesanstalt fiir Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).4 
Trading activities of corporate insiders have been 
subject to a large number of studies. One strand of 
literature focuses on the announcement day of in-
sider transactions and explores if uninformed out-
siders can benefit by mimicking insider transactions 
(e.g., 
1988; Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey 1997; and Fidr-
muc, Goergen, and Renneboog 2006). Remarkably, 
the literature finds that even uninformed outsiders 
can earn abnormal profits using publicly available 
information, at least when transaction costs are 
ignored. 
Another strand of literature is motivated by the 
question whether corporate insiders earn abnormal 
profits by trading in company's stock and thus may 
use their foreknowledge about their firms' prospects 
(e.g., Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968; Jaffe 1974; Fin-
nerty 1976; Seyhun 1986; Eckbo and Smith 1998; 
Jeng, Mebick, and Zeckhauser 2003; Lakon-
ishok and Lee 2001). The international literature 
documents that insiders earn high abnormal profits 
while trading in company's stocks.s While there 
3 Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) show that insider trading 
laws existed in 87 out of 103 countries with a capital market. 
4 Section 2 of this paper discusses the definition of corporate 
insiders as well as the regulation and reporting requirements 
for insider trades in more detail. 
5 A differing result is reported by Eckbo and Smith (1998). 
exist numerous studies focusing on insider trading 
in the US and the UK, until now not much research 
has been conducted on the German capital market. 
This may be due to the fact that until July 1, 2002 
corporate insiders did not have to reveal their trades 
to the regulatory authority.6 However, recent stud-
ies for Germany (see, e.g., Stotz 2006; Klinge, 
Seifert, and Stehle 2005; Betzer and Theissen 2005) 
confirm the finding that corporate insiders earn 
significant profits. In particular, Stotz (2006) exam-
ined insider profits as well as the market reaction at 
the announcement day documenting positive ab-
normal returns for insiders as well as for outsiders 
in the first year following the implementation of the 
reporting obligation in Germany. In addition, he 
shows that German corporate insiders act as con-
trarian investors. Klinge, Seifert, and Stehle (2005) 
also analyze the market reaction around the an-
nouncement and trading day focusing mainly on 
determinants of the market reaction at the an-
nouncement day. Furthermore, they focus on the 
relevance of analyzing non-overlapping observa-
tions. Betzer and Theissen (2005), amongst other 
issues, relate the magnitude of market reaction to 
the ownership structure of the firm and thus con-
tribute to the corporate governance literature. Fi-
nally, Betzer and Theissen (2007) find that prices 
are distorted in the period between the trading and 
the reporting date and thus propose a regulation 
which requires an immediate disclosure of insider 
transactions. 
Although most prior studies routinely attribute 
abnormal profits to insider's superior knowledge 
and therefore to a potential exploitation of inside 
information, a final assessment is anything but triv-
ial. On the one hand, profits of insiders could indeed 
originate in the exploitation of inside information. 
On the other hand, short-term profits documented 
for corporate insiders could at least partly triggered 
by price-pressure caused by outsiders who blindly 
mimic the trades of insiders in a herd-like manner, 
even though the insiders traded just for liquidity 
considerations and not on inside information. 
Therefore, recent studies have tried to link trading 
activities of insiders to their foreknowledge of im-
portant corporate events, including bankruptcy 
(Seyhun and Bradley 1997), dividend initiations 
6 Until July 1, 2002 only companies listed on the Neuer Markt 
segment were required to report insider trading records to the 
Deutsche Borse AG. 
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(John and Lang 1991), seasoned equity offerings 
(Karpoff and Lee 1991), stock repurchases (Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Prutch 1992), takeover bids (Sey-
hun 1990), and earnings announcements (Elliott, 
Morse, and Richardson 1984; Noe 1999; and Ke, 
Huddart, and Petroni 2003). These studies basically 
find that insiders trade upon forthcoming corporate 
news. Thus, the evidence suggests that insiders 
exploit inside information. Unlike the cited studies 
which focus on a particular type of corporate news 
disclosure, Givoly and Palmon (1985) analyze the 
connection between insider trading and a large vari-
ety of news reports published in the Wall Street 
Journal subsequent to the insider trading day. They 
conclude that insiders do not seem to exploit inside 
information as their profits are not associated with 
the disclosure of specific news. Although the cited 
studies investigate the connection between insider 
trading and important corporate events, they have a 
decisive shortcoming. They are not able to link in-
sider trading to a formal definition of inside infor-
mation. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several 
ways. First, distinct from most studies on insider 
trading which focus on capital markets with a long 
history of insider regulation like Anglo-Saxon mar-
kets, we analyze the German market and thus pro-
vide evidence for a market with a relatively new 
legislation. Second, unlike prior studies which were 
unable to link insider trading to a formal definition 
of inside information, the fact that in Germany any 
inside information has to be disclosed via an ad-hoc 
news announcement offers a unique opportunity to 
evaluate whether corporate insiders front-run on 
inside information. Third, the attitude to exploit 
inside information may vary in different types of 
insiders.7 In Germany, three different groups of 
insiders have to report their trading records to the 
BaFin. In particular, members of the executive 
board (senior managers), which are involved in day-
to-day business operations, are obliged to report 
their transactions to the BaFin. In addition, trading 
of members of the supervisory board (directors), 
which are usually not involved in day-to-day busi-
ness operations, must also be reported to the BaFin. 
Last, the group of other insiders, which mainly con-
sists of frunily members of senior managers and 
7 A related question has been addressed under the label "in-
formation hierarchy hypothesis" by Seyhun (1986). 
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directors, has to reveal their trading in company's 
stock. To the best of our knowledge, the question 
whether the group of insiders which is best in-
formed about company's prospects (i.e., senior 
managers) or the group which is probably least 
closely watched by the regulator (i.e., other insiders) 
is most active in trading on inside information, is 
basically unexplored. 
With respect to our first research question which 
deals with the profitability of insider transactions, 
our results confirm the findings of prior study for 
Germany (see, e.g., Stotz 2006; Klinge, Seifert, and 
Stehle 2005; Betzer and Theissen 2005). Corporate 
insiders in Germany are able to identifY profitable 
investment situations and thus realize substantial 
profits by trading in company's stock. Considering a 
20-day period subsequent to the trading day, stocks 
traded by insiders are associated with significant 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs): 4.38% for 
purchases and -1.4 7% for sales. In consequence, 
German insiders earn higher profits compared to 
their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.8 Concerning our 
second research question, we find that insiders as a 
group seem to be engaged in the exploitation of 
inside information on the buy side as they earn sig-
nificantly higher profits with those transactions 
which are shortly succeeded by an ad-hoc news 
disclosure of the respective company. With respect 
to our third research question, we document that 
trading activity prior to ad-hoc news announce-
ments differs between the types of insiders. We find 
the group of directors to be most active in purchas-
ing prior to ad-hoc news disclosures. In contrast, 
senior managers are less active in front-running on 
corporate news as they rarely purchase company's 
stock prior to an ad-hoc news disclosure. Finally, 
and most importantly, we show that directors and 
the group of other insiders earn exceptionally high 
profits with their purchases which front-run on 
corporate news disclosures and thus seem to exploit 
inside information. In contrast, senior managers 
seem to be aware that they are subject to the scru-
tiny of the supervisory authority as they do not real-
ize superior returns with their rare transactions 
succeeded by a corporate news disclosure. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 describes the legal background of insider 
8 See, e.g., Seyhun (1986) for the US and Friederich , Gregory, 
Matatko, and Tonks (2002) for the UK. 
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trading in Germany, whereas section 3 addresses 
the database, provides some descriptive statistics, 
and discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents 
the results concerning our three research questions. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2.LegalBackground 
Since 1934, rule wb-5 of the Security Exchange Act 
prohibits the exploitation of inside information by 
corporate insiders in the United States. A corre-
sponding framework for the German capital market 
was passed as late as in 1994. Since then, § 14 
WpHG (Security Trading Act) prohibits the exploi-
tation and transmission of any inside information. 
According to § 14 WpHG (Security Trading Act) " ... it 
is prohibited to make use of inside information to 
acquire or dispose of insider securities for own 
account or for the account or behalf of a third 
party".9 However, as it might be hard to identify 
which information qualifies as an inside informa-
tion on which trading is prohibited, § 13 WpHG 
contains a legal definition of inside information. In 
particular, § 13 WpHG defines inside information as 
" ... any specific information about circumstances 
which are not subject to public knowledge (. . .), 
which, if it became publicly known, would likely 
have a significant effect on the stock exchange or 
market price of the insider security." Moreover, § 
15 WpHG requires exchange traded firms to disclose 
any inside information immediately to the public 
(ad-hoc announcement). § 15 WpHG demands that 
an "immediate public disclosure is required from 
an issuer of financial instruments (. . .) regarding all 
inside information which directly concerns that 
issuer ... ". Firms usually use special service providers 
which transmit the information to the market to 
fulfill these obligations. 
In 2002, German insider surveillance was extended 
to corporate insiders' transactions in securities of 
their company (Directors' Dealings). Since July 1, 
2002, it is not only prohibited for corporate insiders 
to trade on inside information, but they also have to 
report trades in securities of their company. Accord-
ing to § 15a WpHG, members of the executive board 
and the supervisory board of exchange listed com-
panies, as well as their family members are obliged 
to report transactions in companies' securities to 
9 Please note that the WpHG is originally written in German. 
The English translations of paragraphs are taken from the 
homepage of BaFin. 
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their company and to the German financial supervi-
sory authority BaFin. Trading activities have to be 
reported without delay. Additionally, the firm has to 
publish the trading record on its web site or in a 
financial newspaper. Unlike in the US or UK, trans-
actions carried out by former board members and 
large shareholders are not covered by the German 
insider law and therefore do not have to be re-
ported. Furthermore, no report is required if the 
total amount of all transactions in a 30-day period 
does not exceed € 25,000. In 2004, § 15a was 
amended. Since October 30, 2004, persons dis-
charging managerial responsibilities are also obliged 
to report their transactions. The reporting period for 
trading activities was specified to occur within five 
business days. The lower limit, which does not re-
quire a disclosure, was also reduced to € 5,000 per 
person in a calendar year. Furthermore, companies 
are now required to maintain lists of persons which 
have access to inside information (§ 15b WpHG). 
3· Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data and descriptive Statistics 
Our empirical analysis covers insider transactions in 
German stocks between July 1, 2002 and April 30, 
2005, which were reported to the BaFin. For each 
observation the respective database provided by the 
BaFin contains the company's name, the Interna-
tional Securities Identification Number (ISIN) of 
the reporting company, the name and type of the 
reporting insider (e.g., a member of the executive 
board), the trading and announcement day, the kind 
of transaction (e.g., a purchase of a stock), the num-
ber of securities traded, the stock price at which the 
transaction was executed, and the publishing media. 
To check and complement the database we match 
the information contained in the original database 
with statements from the company's annual reports 
and information published on the company's web 
site and other financial web sites.10 The Deutsche 
Gesellschaft for Ad-hoc Publizitiit (DGAP) and 
euro-adhoc are the main providers which transmit 
ad-hoc news to the market.n We use their databases 
to identify ad-hoc news releases subsequent to the 
to E.g., wvvw.finanzen.net, www.insiderdaten.de. 
11 According to Miirzheuser and Gutzy (2004) the two data 
providers account for more than 95% of all ad-hoc news re-
leases in Germany. 
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trading day. We extract data on dividend and stock 
splits adjusted stock returns from DatastreamP 
As our study focuses on the German legislation and 
the German market we only cover trades in stocks 
with a German ISIN (DE-ISIN). The original data-
base contains 6,328 transactions carried out by 
insiders in 416 different firms. In a first step, we 
exclude duplicate and incomplete entries. Like pre-
vious studies on insider trading (e.g., Finnerty 1976; 
Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis 1994; Fried-
erich, Gregory, Matatko, and Tonks 2002; Hillier 
and Marshall2002; and Korczak, Korczak and Las-
fer 2007), we focus on open-market transactions 
and exclude trades associated with corporate events. 
In particular, we exclude trades associated with 
exercise of options, security lending, changes in the 
capital structure, and takeover bids. In addition, 
transactions among insiders are also excluded. In 
1,577 cases, the database includes two or more 
transactions of the same insider in the same stock 
on a given day. This is the case if an insider trades 
more than once on the same day or if the broker 
executes the order in two or more pieces. We aggre-
gate these partial executions and multiple trades of 
the same individual in the same security on a given 
day. Furthermore, we dropped 136 observations due 
to incomplete return data. In 125 cases firms dis-
close ad-hoc news on the transaction day itself. As 
mentioned before, we use ad-hoc news disclosures 
to link insider trading to a potential exploitation of 
inside information. As we do not have information 
about the exact trading time, we could not deter-
mine whether the corporate insider traded prior to 
the respective ad-hoc news disclosure. Thus, these 
transactions were excluded from the sample. In 
order to avoid a double-counting of observations in 
each group of insiders which could trigger biased 
test statistics, we aggregate trades by different insid-
ers on the same day. If two members of the execu-
tive board of BMW purchase the BMW stock on the 
same day (e.g., manager A purchases for 1 Mio. € 
and manager B purchases for 2 Mio. €), we treat the 
two original transactions as a new transaction with 
the combined transaction volume (e.g., 3 Mio. €). 
Employing this procedure, we lose 270 transactions 
in our final sample. In order to distinguish between 
groups, we finally exclude the 152 transactions 
12 In particular, we use the data type RI from Datastream 
which includes adjustments for dividends and stock splits. 
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where more than one group of insiders traded com-
pany's stock on a specific day. E.g. if a member of 
the executive board and a member of the supervi-
sory board trade in the same stock at the same day, 
both transactions are excluded from the final sam-
ple, since these transactions would distort inference 
about differences in CARs between groups. 
Table 1 shows the generation of our final sample 
which consists of 2,657 insider transactions in 344 
different firms. Thereof, 633 transactions are suc-
ceeded by a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure in 
the following 20 trading days. With respect to the 
information revealed by public ad-hoc news disclo-
sures, we find that 324, and thus about so% of the 
respective ad-hoc news deal with the release of 
quarterly and annual results.13 The remaining ad-
hoc news refer to changes in the executive or super-
visory board (44), changes in the lines of business 
operations like M&A, business expansion or restruc-
turing (73), changes in the capital structure of the 
company (72), or deal with other information like 
patents or, in case of pharmaceutical company, 
information about drug tests, changes in the owner-
ship structure and litigation issues (120). The latter 
group also contains ad-hoc news with multiple rea-
sons like, e.g., a combined release of an earnings 
announcement and a dismissal of an executive 
manager. Moreover, ad-hoc disclosures can either 
be scheduled or unscheduled. Whereas scheduled 
news like the release of earnings figures are known 
by market participants in advance, the remaining 
ad-hoc categories are typically unexpected and thus 
unscheduled. Table 2 shows that the number of 
transactions on the buy and sell side is rather bal-
anced. In particular, purchases account for about 
53% of all insider trades (1,402 out of 2,657). With 
respect to the insider's position, we find members of 
the executive board and members of the supervisory 
board to trade most frequently. In particular, mem-
bers of the executive board (members of the super-
visory board) account for 749 (470) purchases and 
468 (536) sales transactions. They correspond to 
about 46% (38%) of all transactions. Consequently, 
the group of other insiders trades least frequently. 
Besides, the group of other insiders is the only group 
where the number of sales (251) exceeds the num-
ber of purchases (183). 
13 Unlike in the UK in Germany there exists no trading ban 
prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the an-
nouncements of annual results. 
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Table 1: Description of Sample 
Type of Transaction 
Insider Transactions reported to the BaFin 
Number of Transactions 
Transactions in Foreign Corporations Dual Listed in Gem1any 
7,543 
-1,215 
Insider Transactions in German Corporations 
Duplicate and Incomplete Entries 
Transactions concerning 
Otions 
Security Lending and Donation 
Capital Structure 
Take-Over-Bids (ace. WpUG) 
Others 
Transactions among Insiders 
Partial Execution and Multiple Transactions on a Given Day 
Incomplete or No Return Data 
News Disclosure at Transaction Day 
Transactions of Multiple Insiders, Group-Sprecific 
Transactions of Multiple Insiders, Multiple Groups 















Insider Transactions in the Final Sample with News Disclosure 






Changes in Executive or Supervisory Board 
Changes in Business Operations 
Changes in Capital Structure 
Others 120 
Insider Transactions in the Final Sample without News Disclosure 2,024 
This table displays the number of transactions reported to the BaFin as well as the necessary corrections to obtain the final sample. 
In total, insiders traded stocks for more than € 1.46 
billion. Interestingly, although they trade least fre-
quently, the group of other insiders trade the high-
est volumes accounting for almost 41% of the total 
trading volume. In particular, their median (mean) 
transaction volume of € 70,268 (€ 1,386,945) is 
above the average. Senior managers and directors 
trade smaller volumes. The median (mean) transac-
tion volume for senior managers accounts for 
€ 27,600 (€ 288,816) whereas the respective num-
ber for directors is € 23,265 (€ 501,128). We also 
find that transaction volumes for purchases are on 
average smaller than for sales. The median (mean) 
transaction volume for sales of€ 55,590 (€ 784,956) 
is about two to three times larger than the volume 
for purchases € 19,350 € (€ 336,971). Consequently, 
although the number of sales is lower than the 
number of purchases, sales account for 68% of the 
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total trading volume. Moreover, all groups of insi-
ders are net sellers. As in most empirical studies the 
distribution of firm size is skewed. The mean market 
capitalization of a traded firm is € 1,644 million and 
thereby highly exceeds the median market capitali-
zation which equals € 43 million. 
3.2. Methodology 
The purpose of our study is to measure the short-
term profits of insiders which trade in their com-
pany's stock. In accordance with most studies on 
insider trading, we measure these profits in an event 
study framework. We measure abnormal returns, 
i.e., returns that deviate from the normal return, 
subsequent to the insider trading day by applying 
standard event-study methodology outlined by 
For each transaction, calendar 
time is converted to event time by defining the day 
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on which the insider executes the transaction as 
event day [ o]. The estimation period encompasses 
the period from from [-199] to [-21], whereas the 
period from [-20] to [ +20] is defined as the event 
period. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
for raw returns of each traded stock, we estimate 
OLS parameters in the estimation period while us-
ing the value-weighted CDAX as the independent 
variable. This index consists of stocks listed on the 
Purchases Sales All Transactions 
Number of Traded Firms 235 242 344 
Number of Transactions 
Total 1,402 1,255 2,657 
Members of Executive Board 749 468 1,217 
Members of Supervisory Board 470 536 1,006 
Other Insiders 183 251 434 
Mean Value of Transactions (in €thousand) 
Total 336,97 1 784,959 548,573 
Members of Executive Board 95,536 598, 146 288,8 16 
Members of Supervisory Board 494,297 507,117 501,128 
Other Insiders 921,077 1,726,60 1 1,386,945 
Median Value of Transactions (in €thousand) 
Total 19,350 55,590 30,000 
Members of Executive Board 15,634 69,650 27,600 
Members of Supervisory Board 16,535 34,280 23,265 
Other Insiders 49,350 80,200 70,268 
Mean Market Capitalization (in €million) 
Total 2,024 1,220 1,644 
Members of Executive Board 2,057 440 1,435 
Members of Supervisory Board 1,398 1,410 1,405 
Other Insiders 3,495 2,269 2,786 
Median Market Capitalization (in €million) 
Total 33 51 43 
Members of Executive Board 33 55 40 
Members of Supervisory Board 28 38 30 
Other Insiders 127 130 129 
This table presents descriptive statistics. In particular, information about the number of transactions, the mean (median) value of transac-
tions and the mean (median) market capitalization of traded firms are displayed for the entire sample (all transactions) as well as for 
purchases and sales separately. 
Abnormal returns for any given point in time and 
stock are defined as the difference between realized 
and normal returns. In order to estimate these ex-
pected normal returns, we choose the market model 
as surveyed by Brown and Warner (1985).14 First, 
14 Please note that there exists a large number of models to 
estimate expected returns in event studies, like the constant 
mean return model, the market adjusted model or the Fama-
French 3-factor model. However, for event studies analyzing 
the market reaction for just a few trading days the market 
model evolved as the standard in literature. E.g., the probably 
most prominent review articles on event study methodology 
(MacKinlay 1997 and Kothari and Warner 2007) recommend 
using the market model to estimate abnormal returns in 
short-run event studies. In addition to these methodological 
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Frankfurt Stock Exchange either in the Prime Stan-
dard or in the General Standard.1s Within the con-
text of the market model, the normal return on each 
day in the event period is defined as the return of 
considerations, the market model has also evolved as the 
standard model in the insider trading literature. In particular, 
the reference studies for Germany (Stotz 2006 and Betzer and 
Theissen 2005) use the market model to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
15 The Prime Standard and the General Standard encompass 
all stocks listed in the regulated segment of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange. In addition, stocks listed in the Prime Stan-
dard have to fulfill higher transparency standards compared to 
stocks in the General Standard. 
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the CDAX, adjusted by the estimated OLS para-
meters. As a consequence, abnormal returns derived 
from the market model are adjusted for individual 
stock's risk and the market return. To calculate the 
market reaction for more than one day we cumulate 
abnormal returns for the respective period. 
In order to test for statistical significance of abnor-
mal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal re-
urns (CARs) we first apply a parametric test, the 
standardized cross-sectional test proposed by 
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). This test 
has shown to be superior to the traditional t-test in 
the presence of event-induced increases in vari-
ances. However, parametric tests are sensitive to 
asymmetrically distributed returns (e.g., Brown and 
Warner 1985; and Corrado 1989). Thus, we also 
employ the nonparametric rank test based on Cor-
rado (1989) to test for robustness. This type of test is 
correctly specified independently from the skewness 
of cross-sectional distribution of abnormal returns. 
4· Empirical Results 
4.1. Insider Profits 
First, we address the question whether corporate 
insiders do earn abnormal returns by trading in 
their company's stock. Table 3 displays cumulative 
abnormal returns for distinct periods prior and 
subsequent to the insider trading day for purchases 
and sales, separately. It shows that corporate insid-
ers actually do earn abnormal returns with their 
transactions. 
Looking at the immediate stock price reaction asso-
ciated with purchases, we find a moderate but in-
significant CAR[o;+1] of 0.29%. This immediate 
price reaction does not offer economically signifi-
cant profits to insiders. Nevertheless, cumulative 
abnormal returns for longer periods are both statis-
tically (according to the parametric standardized 
cross-sectional test by Boehmer, Musumeci, and 
Poulsen and the nonparametric rank test by Cor-
rado) as well as economically significant. E.g., the 
cumulative abnormal return for the 20-day period 
following the trading day CAR[o;+20] offers a de-
cent 4.38% profit for the average insider transaction 
on the buy side. Thus, our result is in line with the 
findings of Stotz (2006) and Betzer and Theissen 
(2005). The latter study reports within a two-year 
investigation period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 
2004, cumulative abnormal profits of 3.60 % for a 
20- day period subsequent to the trading day. We 
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therefore confirm their finding that insider profits 
on the buy side are somewhat higher for the Ger-
man market than those documented for the US and 
the UK. E.g., for the US, Seyhun (1986) reports a 
cumulated abnormal return for the 20-day period 
subsequent to the trading day of 1.10%, whereas 
Friederich, Gregory, Matatko, and Tonks (2002) 
document a respective profit of 1.96% for the UK. 
Interestingly, from the perspective of the efficient 
market hypothesis, the price reaction is strikingly 
slow. In particular, after a period of five trading days 
subsequent to the insider transaction, only about 
37% of the total increase within the 20-day event 
window is incorporated in stock prices (1.62% com-
pared to 4.38%). The respective fraction for the ten-
day period is about 61% (CAR[o;+10] equals 
2.66%), an almost linear adjustment to the cumula-
tive abnormal return at the end of the event win-
dow. The rather slow adjustment in stock prices 
might be explained by legal aspects concerning re-
porting obligations. As discussed before, corporate 
insiders have to announce their trading records to 
the regulatory authority BaFin shortly after they 
have executed their order. Our data reveals that the 
median (mean) time period between the trading and 
the announcement day is three (nine) trading days 
for purchases. Thus, since insider transactions are 
closely followed by many investors, it may trigger a 
wave of transactions in the same direction by out-
siders, thereby generating abnormal returns subse-
quent to the trading day.'6 
With respect to sale transactions, a different picture 
emerges. The immediate price reaction CAR[o;+1] 
shows to be significantly positive with 0.26%. Thus, 
stock prices do not reflect the negative information 
immediately. However, if one looks at the 20 trad-
ing days after the transaction, stocks sold by insid-
ers drop by -1.47%. Although this moderate decline 
in stock prices does not necessarily yield economi-
cally significant profits for insiders when direct and 
indirect transactions costs are taken into account 
(see, e.g., Keirn and Madhavan (1998); Berkowitz 
and Logue (2001), for the different components of 
transaction cost), the cumulative abnormal return is 
I6 Please note that the finding of a slow price adjustment is 
documented in several other studies. See, e.g., Givoly and 
Palmon (1985); Seyhun (1986); Bettis, Vickrey, and Vickrey 
(1997); J eng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) for the US; 
Friederich, Gregory, Matatko, and Tonks (2002) for the UK; 
and Klinge, Seife1t , and Stehle 2005; and Stotz (2006) for 
Germany. 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open~ Journal of VHB 
Ve<band der Hochschullehrer fur Betriebswirtschaft e. v. 
Volume 1 I Issue 2 I December 20081188·205 
statistically significant according to the parametric 
as well as the non-parametric test. 
Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 
Purchases and Sales 
Pw·chase (N = 1402) 
Mean SD Mean 
CAR[2o;-1] -0.75% +++ 17.24 8.64% 
CAR[o;t] 0.29% 5·97 0.26% 
CAR[o;s] 1.62% *** ++ + 10.31 0 .12% 
nificant positive CAR[-20;-1] of 8.64% in the 20 
trading days prior to the insider trading day. Thus, 
corporate insiders seem to time their selling after 
significant price run-ups. Second, another non in-
formation-driven reason which is more prevalent 
Sales (N = 1255) 
SD 
*** +++ 29.81 
*** 8-41 
13.14 
CAR[o;to] 2.66% *** ++ + 14.36 -0.84% *"~* +++ 16.14 
for sales than for 
purchases is liquid-
ity. If a corporate 
insider wants to buy 
a new mansion or 
Learjet, she might 
prefer to sell some 
corporate stocks, 
especially if they 
recently went up in 
CAR[o;2o] 4·38% *** ++ + 18.92 -1.4~Ai 
This table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns for dis-
tinct periods prior and subsequent to the day of insider trading 
[o]. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, s%-, 
10%-level (two-tailed test) according to standardized cross-
sectional test proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991). +++, ++,+indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, s%-, 
w%-level according to the nonparametric rank test based on 
Corrado (1989). 
The finding that insiders realize greater profits with 
their purchases than with their sales is also fre-
quently documented in the literature.17 Unlike pur-
chases, which are primarily motivated by the desire 
to realize profits, sales might be triggered by other 
considerations. First, basically only sales are moti-
vated by diversification objectives and therefore 
might be non information-driven. For instance, 
many senior managers are strongly invested with 
their human capital in their firm and often have 
large holdings of company's stock. In addition, sen-
ior managers are increasingly compensated by stock 
option programs which allocate a substantial part of 
their personal wealth to their firm. Our data reveal 
that corporate insiders reduce their exposure in the 
company after substantial price increases. In par-
ticular, insiders sell stocks which yield a highly sig-
17 See, e.g., Bettis Vickrey, and Vickrey (1997); Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001); and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) for 
the US; Friederich, Grego1y, Matatko, and Tonks (2002) for 
the UK. In contrast, almost symmetrical profits on both buy 
and sell side are found by, e.g., Seyhun (1986); Givoly and 
Pal~on (1985); Klinge, eifert, and Stehle (2005); Betzer and 
Theissen (2005); and Stotz (2006). In particular, Betzer and 
Theissen (2005) find an almost symmetrical market reaction 
on the buy and sell side for the German market. In particular, 
they report a CAR[o;2o] of -3.53%. Differing results could, 
however, be explained by a differing sample period as well as 
differences in analyzed transactions as Betzer and Theissen 
(2005) also include sale transactions from exercised stock 
options. 
*** +++ 24.35 
prices. Moreover, sales may be motivated by tax 
considerations. 
4.2. Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside 
Iriformation? 
A decisive prerequisite to answer the question 
whether corporate insiders exploit inside informa-
tion is the identification of those transactions which 
may exploit inside information. In an ideal world , 
one could directly observe the information set of an 
insider at the transaction day. Unfortunately, in 
reality this information is unobservable. 
Thus, one has to find an observable proxy for inside 
information. Probably the best way to formally iden-
tify trades which are likely to be based on inside 
information, is to link corporate insider trading to 
ad-hoc news disclosures subsequent to the insider 
trading day. As mentioned before, German firms are 
required to disclose any inside information (§ 13 
WpHG) to the public via an ad-hoc announcement 
(§ 15 WpHG). Those ad-hoc announcements deal 
with corporate events which are likely to have a 
significant effect on the stock price like, e.g., 
changes in the executive board structure, earnings 
announcements, and merger activities. Thus, in-
sider trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures is a 
first indicator for an exploitation of inside informa-
tion since corporate insiders are likely to know at 
least the tendency of the ad-hoc news prior to 
theirdisclosure. For instance, it is hard to believe 
that a senior manager is not continuously informed 
about the performance of her firm or is not involved 
in and informed about takeover or merger proceed-
ings. 
Table 4 displays for each group of insiders the 
group-specific fraction of trades with subsequent 
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ad-hoc news disclosure in the suspected period 
[ +1;+20], separately. In addition, the respective 
fraction for the total sample and the difference be-
tween the groups and the total sample are displayed 
in the table. Panel A shows the respective statistics 
for purchases, whereas Panel B refers to sales. 
front-running transactions. On the other hand, 
insiders could exploit inside information even 
though they trade less frequently prior to ad-hoc 
news. For instance, an insider could refrain from 
trading prior to the subsequent release of ad-hoc 
news disclosures which have low value but front-run 
Table 4: Fraction of Transactions with Subsequent Ad-hoc News Disclosure, by Type of In-
sider and Compared to the Total Sample 
Panel A. Purchases (N = 1402) 
Members of Members of 
Other Insiders 
Executive Board SuEervisory Board 
Percentage of Purchases with News in Group (1) 20.16% 26.38% 23.50% 
Percentage of Purchases with News in Total Sample (2) 22.68% 22.68% 22.68% 
(1)-(2) -2.52% * 3.70% * 0.82% 
Panel B. Sales (N = 1255) 
Members of Members of 
Other Insiders 
Executive Board Supervisory Board 
Percentage of Sales with News in Group (1) 23.50% 25.56% 27.09% 
Percentage of Sales with News in Total Sample (2) 25.10% 25.10% 25.10% 
(1)-(2) -1.60% 0.46% 1.99% 
This table reports the distribution of purchases and sales for the total sample andfor different types of insiders separately. (1) dis-
plays for the respective group of insider the fraction of transactions with a subsequent news disclosure to the total number of transac-
tions by the respective group in the period [ +1;+20]. Accordingly, (2) gives the respective fraction for the total sample. ***, **, * indi-
cate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level according to the binomial test. 
As far as purchases are concerned, we find that a 
fraction of about 22.68% (318 out of 1,402) of all 
transactions is succeeded by an ad-hoc disclosure in 
the suspected period. Looking at the different 
groups of insiders, we find that senior managers are 
least often engaged in transactions which are suc-
ceeded by corporate news disclosures. The fraction 
of purchases with a subsequent ad-hoc news disclo-
sure is only 20.16%. A different picture emerges for 
directors. With respect to trading prior to ad-hoc 
news disclosures, 26.38% of the purchases carried 
out by directors are executed shortly prior to an ad-
hoc disclosure. In contrast to the findings for pur-
chases, we do not find any group of insiders to be 
particularly engaged in trading prior to ad-hoc news 
disclosure on the sell side. 
However, trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
evaluate whether corporate insiders exploit inside 
information. On the one hand, insiders could trade 
rather frequently prior to ad-hoc disclosures which, 
however, have a negligible value. In this case, corpo-
rate insiders should not realize superior profits with 
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on rare and exceptionally relevant information. If 
this scenario occurs, insiders would realize superior 
profits even though they do not trade particularly 
often prior to ad-hoc news disclosures. 
Thus, our criterion to detect an exploitation of in-
side information refers to the profitability of trad-
ing. If insiders systematically purchase stocks prior 
to positive ad-hoc news and sell stocks prior to 
negative ad-hoc news, they should, ceteris paribus, 
earn higher profits with these transactions com-
pared to the remaining transactions. On the con-
trary, if insiders do not condition their trading deci-
sions on the information content of subsequent ad-
hoc news releases and, thus, purchase stocks as 
often prior to good as before bad news, 18 the average 
profits of transactions with subsequent ad-hoc news 
disclosure should be similar to profits of transac-
tions without subsequent news disclosure. As a con-
sequence, we feel confident to accuse insiders of 
18 Korczak, Korczak, and Lasfer (2007) report for a large 
sample of news releases by UK firms that positive news occurs 
as frequently as negative news. T 
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exploiting inside information if transactions of in-
siders, which are succeeded by an ad-hoc news dis-
closure of the respective company in the subsequent 
20 trading days, are associated with higher profits 
compared to the remaining transactions without an 
ad-hoc news disclosure. In the following, we will 
refer to those transactions as unethical. 
Univariate Analyses 
Table 5 (see following page) displays cumulative 
abnormal returns for several short-term periods 
subsequent to the insider trading day for purchases 
(Panel A) and sales (Panel B). The first vertical 
panel refers to all transactions. Herein, the first 
column addresses transactions with an ad-hoc news 
disclosure in the subsequent 20 trading days 
(News). The second column refers to transactions 
without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure (No 
News) and the third vertical panel displays the dif-
ference in means between the first two columns. 
The second through fourth vertical panels display 
group-specific results. The first columns in those 
panels display the mean returns for transactions 
with a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure for each 
group of insiders, whereas the second column dis-
plays the difference in means between the respective 
group-specific returns and the profits of all transac-
tions without a subsequent news disclosure. 
With respect to purchases, we find that insiders as a 
group earn particularly high profits with their front 
running transactions. Corporate insiders earn an 
abnormal profit of 7.38% within the 20 trading days 
after front-running on ad-hoc news disclosures.19 
For transactions without a subsequent ad-hoc news 
disclosure, we document a respective value of mere 
3.50%. Moreover, the difference in mean profits 
between trades which front -run on corporate news 
disclosure and the remaining transactions without a 
subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure is statistically 
significant starting with CAR[o;+5] onward. Thus, 
corporate insiders as a group seem to purchase 
company's stock systematically prior to positive 
19 Our results further reveal that trading prior to both scheduled 
and unscheduled ad-hoc news is associated with high returns. In 
particular, trading prior to scheduled (unscheduled) news is 
associated with a cumulative abnormal return in the period 
[o;+20] of 5.13% (9.39%), Please note that Betzer and Theissen 
(2005) document a similar return for trading prior to scheduled 
news. In particular, they report 5.26% for purchases which are 
executed two months prior to an annual or interim earnings 
announcement, and the month prior to a quarterly earnings 
announcement (blackout period according to UK legislation). 
news. This reasoning is also supported if one ana-
lyzes the abnormal returns on the disclosure day of 
the ad-hoc news subsequent to insider purchases. 
Whereas 62.58% of the ad-hoc news subsequent to 
purchases of corporate insiders is associated with 
positive abnormal returns, only a minority of 
37-42% trigger a negative market reaction at the day 
of the ad-hoc news disclosure. 
Similar to our findings for purchases, profits associ-
ated with sale transactions which front-run on cor-
porate news are considerably higher for all analyzed 
periods. E.g., according to the first column of Panel 
B of Table 5 the CAR[o;+20] is double the magni-
tude for sales which front-run on subsequent news 
releases compared to the remaining transactions. 
However, the differences in means between sale 
transactions with and without subsequent news 
disclosure are statistically insignificant. This might 
be caused by abnormal returns on the disclosure 
day of the ad-hoc news subsequent to insider sales. 
In particular, the number of positive and negative 
market reactions is rather balanced as 53.65% trig-
ger a positive and 46.35% trigger a negative market 
reaction. 
Given the evidence that insiders as a group seem to 
exploit inside information, we are curious which 
type of corporate insider is particularly engaged in 
exploiting inside information. To put things differ-
ently, we want to figure out whether it is primarily 
the group of members of the executive board (ex-
ecutive managers), the group of members of the 
supervisory board (directors), or the group of other 
corporate insiders which tend to trade in an unethi-
cal manner. This question is basically an empirical 
one, since two opposite effects are simultaneously at 
work. 
On the one hand, senior managers which are in-
volved in day-to-day business operations have supe-
rior access to inside information compared to the 
two other groups of insiders. Thus, concerning the 
criterion of accessibility to inside information, sen-
ior managers might be most tempted to front-run 
on important corporate news. On the other hand, 
one has to be aware that senior managers are also in 
the spotlight of public attention, and, more impor-
tantly, probably under particular scrutiny of the 
regulatory authority. Hence, the fear of prosecution 
might weaken their intention to exploit inside in-
formation. With respect to the two other groups of 
insiders, monitoring might be less pronounced. 
Consequently, directors and other insiders might be 
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more bold to trade on their inside information as 
they do not fear a thorough inspection of their trad-
ing records. 
content of the subsequently released ad-hoc news. 
We get a similar result concerning the group of 
other insiders. Even though other insiders do not 
Tables: Cumulative Abnormal Returns, by Ad-hoc News Disclosure After Transaction 
Panel A. Purchases 
All Transactions Members of Executive Board Members of Supervisory Board Other Insiders 
News No News Di±Icrcncc News Di±Icrcncc News Differe-nce News DitlCrcncc 
N ~318 N ~ 1084 in means N ~ 151 to No News N ~ 124 to No News N ~43 to No News 
N ~ 1084 N ~ 1084 N ~ 1084 
CAR[O; l] 0.28% 0.30% -O.o2% · 0.16% -0.46% 0.63% 0.33% 0.8 1% 0.5 1% 
CAR[0;5] 2.73% **"' 1.30% *** 1.43% II 0.92% 0.38% 4.71% "'"' 3.41% Ill 3.39% "'""" 2.09% 
CAR[O;IO] 4.96% **"' 1.99% H>l< 2.97% +++ 1.51% 0.48% 8.52% *"'* 6.53% +++ 6.85% *** 4.86% ++ 
CAR[0;20] 7.38% *** 3.50% *** 3.88% I II 2.6 1% -0.89% 12.96% "'"'"' 9.46% Ill 8.03% *** 4 .53% II 
Panel B. Sales 
All Transac-tions Members of Executive Board Members of Supervisory Board Other Tnsiders 
News No News Difference News Difference News Difference News Difference 
N ~ 315 N ~ 940 in means N~ II O to No News N ~ 137 to No News N ~68 to No News 
N ~ 940 N ~ 940 N ~940 
CAR[O; l] 0.24% * 0.27% ** -0.03% 0.59% * 0.32% -0.36% -0.63% 0.9 1% 0.64% 
CAR[0;5] -0.19% 0.22% -0.41 % -0.46% -0.68% 0.51% 0.29% -1.15% -1.3 7% 
CAR[O;lO] -1.08% -0.76% *** -0.32% -0.63% 0.13% -0.70% 0.06% -2.51% - 1.75% 
CAR[0;20] -2.41 % ** -1.1 6% *** -1.25% -2.43% ** -1.27% -2.10% -0.94% -3.00% -1.84% 
This table displays mean cumulative abnormal returns f or distinct periods subsequent to the day of insider trading [ o] separated 
by whether ad-hoc news were disclosed during the 20 trading days subsequent to the transaction and by type of insider. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level (two-tailed test) that the mean cumulative abnormal return is different 
from zero according to the cross-sectional rank test proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). With respect to com-
parisons of cumulative abnormal returns between subgroups, +++, ++, + indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, s %-, 10%-level 
according to the two-sample t-test. 
Table 5 provides interesting empirical evidence 
concerning the trading behavior of different groups 
of insiders. On the buy-side, we find that senior 
managers do not seem to be engaged in front-
running on inside information. Not only do they 
trade least frequently prior to ad-hoc disclosures, 
but senior managers also do not realize superior 
profits. Particularly, the CAR[o;+20] equals 2.61% 
for purchases with subsequent news disclosures in 
the 20 trading days after the insider's trading day, 
whereas the remaining transactions yield a profit of 
3.50%. However, from a statistical point of view, the 
difference in means of -0.89% is not statistically 
different from zero. 
A very different picture emerges when we look at 
directors' purchases. In addition to their signifi-
cantly higher trading frequency prior to ad-hoc 
news releases, they seem to trade on valuable in-
formation. E.g., the CAR[o;+20] for front-running 
purchases for directors equals 12.96%. The differ-
ence in mean profits of front-running transactions 
compared to no news transactions is statistically 
significant for all analyzed periods from [o;+5] on-
wards and equals 9-46% for the period [o;+20]. This 
indicates that directors trade on the information 
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frequently front-run on corporate news, they do 
realize exceptional profits with those transactions. 
In particular, they realize a handsome profit with a 
CAR[o;+20] of 8.03% with their front-running pur-
chases. Additionally, the difference in means com-
pared to the no news transactions shows to be 
4-53%, a profit significant on the 5%-level. 
Given that other insiders seem to exploit inside 
information, a natural question arises. How does 
the group of other insider split between family 
members of executive managers and family mem-
bers of directors? For purchases, the 183 transac-
tions of other insiders are anything but uniformly 
distributed across the two remaining insider groups. 
Only 39 transactions of other insiders could be 
traced to a relative of a member of the executive 
board, whereas the majority of 116 transactions can 
be directed to a member of the supervisory board. 
The remaining 28 transactions could not be unam-
biguously assigned to one group or the other. Al-
though, family members of executive managers do 
not trade very often, they nonetheless seem to ex-
ploit inside information with their 12 transactions 
which are succeeded by an ad-hoc disclosure. Look-
ing at the 20-day period following the transaction 
2 
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day, family members of executive managers earn 
8.57% with their transactions succeeded by an ad-
hoc news disclosure. Concerning family members of 
directors, results do not differ much whether the 
insider traded by himself or through a family mem-
ber. In particular, in the 20 trading days subsequent 
to the insider trading day, family members of direc-
tors earn 8.24% with those transactions which 
front-run on corporate news. 
Regarding sales transactions, we find no specific 
group of insiders to be severely engaged in exploit-
ing inside information. Although according to Table 
5, we predominately find the profits associated with 
sales which front-run on corporate news to be 
higher for executive managers and directors, differ-
ences in means of abnormal returns are not statisti-
cally significant. 
Multivariate Analyses 
In order to test for robustness, we complement our 
univariate analysis by performing multivariate re-
gressions. Basically, we want to verify the conjecture 
that higher profits of front -running transactions on 
the buy side are indeed driven by subsequent ad-hoc 
news disclosures. In contrast, they could be trig-
gered solely by common characteristics of the trans-
action not accounted for in univariate group com-
parisons. Thus, Table 6 (on page 15) displays multi-
variate regression results for two models on the 
dependent variables CAR[o;+10] and CAR[o;+20]. 
The most important independent variable is the 
dummy variable NEWS, which equals one if the 
company discloses ad-hoc news in the period 
[ +1;+20] subsequent to the trading day and zero 
otherwise. The first model includes besides a num-
ber of control variables listed below the NEWS vari-
able exclusively, which - in this model - measures 
the effect of a subsequent ad-hoc disclosure on cu-
mulative abnormal returns. The second model dif-
fers from the first one as it additionally includes two 
interaction terms in order to reveal differences be-
tween the three groups of insiders. The two interac-
tions terms are (i) NEWS, multiplied by a dummy 
variable indicating whether an insider is a member 
of the supervisory board (SUPERVISORY BOARD), 
and (ii) NEWS multiplied by a dummy variable 
indicating whether an insider is a member of the 
group of other insiders (OTHER INSIDERS). One 
can interpret the respective coefficients of the inter-
action terms as the differential effect for transac-
tions (i) of directors and (ii) other insiders com-
pared to transactions of senior managers for the 
sub-sample of front-running transactions. Finally, 
the coefficient on NEWS indicates the differential 
effect of front-running transactions by senior man-
agers compared to the remaining transactions with-
out a subsequent news disclosure. 
In order to take common characteristics of a trans-
action into account, we include a set of control vari-
ables concerning trade-specific factors as well as 
company-specific factors.2° Concerning trade-
specific factors, we construct several control vari-
ables which relate to characteristics of the transac-
tion. First, e.g., Seyhun (1992); Bettis, Vickrey, and 
Vickrey (1997); and Fidrmuc, Georgen, and Renne-
boog (2006) have shown that relatively large vol-
ume trades yield higher returns than small volumes. 
Thus, in order to control for the trading volume we 
construct the variable TRADING_INTENSITY, 
which is defined as the trading volume of the re-
spective transaction divided by the market value of 
the firm on the trading day. Second, we control for 
the delay in reporting. We expect that corporate 
insiders are more reluctant to report their trades in 
a timely manner for those trades which are based on 
valuable information. Thus, we include the variable 
REPORTING_DELAY, which counts the number of 
trading days between the transaction day and the 
reporting day. Third, Seyhun (1986) has shown that 
insider profits are negatively related to prior per-
formance. Because of this evidence and due to our 
finding that insiders are contrarian investors, 2 1 we 
include the variable MOMENTUM which measures 
the cumulative abnormal return prior to the trading 
day in the period CAR[-20;-1]. Fourth, if several 
insiders trade the same stock on a particular date, 
this might reveal a stronger signal about the insid-
ers' estimation of the company's prospects. Accord-
ingly, Fidrmuc, Georgen, and Renneboog (2006) 
have shown that the market reaction of insider 
transactions depends on the number of simultane-
ously acting traders. Therefore, we introduce the 
dummy variable MULTIPLE_TRADERS, which 
equals one if more than one insider traded the stock 
on the same day and zero otherwise. Fifth, we con-
20 With respect to both categories we include foremost those 
control variables which have shown to be significant determinants 
in prior research. 
21 A contrarian investor is someone who purchases after a recent 
decline in stock prices and sells after a recent increase in stock 
prices. As one can see from Table 3, the tendency to act as a con-
trarian investor is more pronounced on the sell side. 
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trol for structural changes according to the changing 
legal environment within the sample period. The 
dummy variable LEGISLATION equals one if the 
transaction takes place after the reform of insider 
trading regulations on October 30, 2004 and zero 
otherwise. 
We also include a set of control variables referring to 
company characteristics. First, since several studies 
(e.g., Seyhun 1986 and Gregory, Matatko, Tonks, 
and Purkis 1994) have shown that profits are higher 
for smaller firms, we define the variable SIZE, which 
equals the natural logarithm of the market value of a 
firm at the beginning of the respective calendar 
year, to control for the firm's size. Second, our re-
sults might be triggered by thinly traded stocks. 
Thus, we include the dummy variable 
PENNY_STOCK, which equals one if the respective 
stock is traded at a price below one euro at the day 
of the transaction and zero otherwise. Third, previ-
ous research has documented a decisive role of the 
price-to-book ratio in explaining (abnormal) returns 
(see, e.g., Fama and French 1993; and Fama and 
French 1995). Thus, we include the variable 
PRICE_TO_BOOK, which equals the market value 
compared to the book value of a firm at the transac-
tion day. Finally, Fidrmuc, Georgen, and Renne-
boog (2006) and Betzer and Theissen (2005) show 
that profits for corporate insiders and the market 
reaction to the announcement of insider transac-
tions depend on the firms' ownership structure. 
Therefore we include two variables to control for the 
ownership structure and the corporate governance 
structure of the firm. The variable FREEFLOAT 
proxies the level of management autonomy and is 
defined as the fraction of shares in the free float as 
opposed to shares held by block holders. Moreover, 
we control for dominating shareholders including 
the dummy variable BLOCKHOLDER, which equals 
one if the respective company has a majority share-
holder (i.e., a single shareholder controls more than 
so percent of the voting shares) and zero otherwise. 
In order to evaluate whether the size of both boards 
have an influence on insider profits, we include the 
variable SUPERVISORY BOARD_SIZE (EXECU-
TIVE BOARD_SIZE), which represents the number 
of board members in each board. 
As far as purchases are concerned, the first models 
in Table 6 (see following page) which exclude the 
interaction terms confirm our univariate finding 
that corporate insiders as a group earn exceptional 
profits by front-running on corporate news. In par-
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ticular, the coefficients for the dummy variable 
NEWS are positive and statistically significant for 
both periods. Concerning the control variables, the 
signs of the coefficients are predominantly in line 
with our predictions. Interestingly, however, the 
coefficient on MULTIPLE_TRADES is significantly 
negative in both regressions. Thus, insiders earn 
mediocre profits with those transactions where 
more than one insider traded a stock at the same 
time. The finding contradicts the prediction that the 
information value might be larger if a bunch of in-
sider flock together in their trading decision but 
confirm the results of Betzer and Theissen (2005) 
who report a similar finding. Moreover, the size of 
the boards does not affect cumulative abnormal 
returns in a systematic way. Regarding sale transac-
tions, multivariate regression support the univariate 
finding that corporate insiders as a group do not 
earn significantly higher profits with front-running 
transactions. The results displayed in Panel B of 
Table 6 show the respective coefficients on the vari-
able NEWS to be negative but insignificant. 
Multivariate regression analyses conducted in the 
second models support our findings concerning the 
different types of insiders. Looking at members of 
the executive board, regression results emphasize 
that members of the executive board do not seem to 
front-run on valuable ad-hoc news. As displayed in 
Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient of NEWS in the 
second model, which measures the differential ef-
fects of front-running transaction by members of 
the executive board compared to the remaining 
transactions (No News), is insignificant. 
According to the two remaining groups of insiders, 
multivariate regression results confirm the univari-
ate conjunction that these groups seem to exploit 
inside information. As far as directors are con-
cerned, the coefficient on the respective interaction 
term is highly significant, indicating that directors 
earn more with their front running transactions 
than executive managers. 
The effect compared to the no news transactions is 
captured by the sum of the coefficients on NEWS 
and NEWS*SUPERVISORY BOARD. In particular, 
the sum of coefficients shows to be significant on the 
1%-level for both analyzed periods. Analogously, the 
finding that front-running transactions of other 
insiders yield exceptionally high profits is also sup-
ported by multivariate results for the period 
[0;+10], but not for the longer event window. 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open~ Journal of VHB 
Ve<band der Hochschullehrer fur Betriebswirtschaft e. v. 
Volume 1 I Issue 2 I December 20081188·205 
Table 6: Cumulative abnormal returns, by ad-hoc news disclosure after transaction 
Panel A. Purchases 
CAR[O;IO] CAR[0;10] CAR[0;20] CAR[0;20] 
Coefficient t -stat Coefficient t -stat Coefficient t -stat Coefficient t-stat 
c 0.0381 2.77 *** 0.0408 2.93 ••• 0.0680 3.53 *** 0.0717 3.68 *** 
NEWS 0.0231 2.53 ** -0.0014 -0.13 0.0327 2.67 *** -0.0028 -0.21 
NEWS*SUPERVISORY BOARD 0.0490 2.62 *** 0.0832 3.30 *** 
NEWS*OTHER INSIDERS 0.0440 2.21 ** 0.03 17 1.30 
TRADING INTENSITY 0.1624 0.72 0. 1650 0.73 0.3099 0.86 0.3264 0.90 
REPORTING_ DELAY 0.0000 0.68 0.0000 0.61 0.0001 0.86 0.000 1 0.84 
MOMENTUM 0.0556 1.06 0.0545 1.05 0.0614 0.94 0.0597 0.93 
NUMBER_Of _TRADERS -0.0178 ·3.67 *** -0.0209 -3.86 *** ·0.0296 -4.79 *** ·0.0357 ·5.10 *** 
LEGISLATION 0.0078 0.90 0.0056 0.64 0.0192 1.41 0.0184 1.31 
SIZE -0.0058 -1.79 * -0.0064 -1.99 ** -0.0082 -1.97 ** -0.0090 -2.1 8 ** 
PENNY STOCK 0.2164 3.75 ••• 0.2088 3.65 ••• 0.2703 3.41 ••• 0.2567 3.31 *** 
PRICE TO BOOK -0.0018 -4.45 ••• -0.0016 -4.09 ••• -0.0023 -3.48 ••• -0.0019 -3.29 *** 
FREEFLOAT 0.0005 2.23 ** 0.0005 2.28 ** 0.0007 2.40 ** 0.0007 2.48 ** 
BLOCKHOLDER -0.0082 ·0.94 ·0.0081 ·0.92 -0.0315 ·2.96 *** ·0.0321 -2.99 *** 
SUPERVISORY BOARD_SIZE 0.0006 0.45 0.0006 0.50 0.0003 0.19 0.0006 0.34 
EXECUTIVE BOARD_SIZE 0.0004 0.15 0.0011 0.38 0.0037 1.00 0.0047 1.27 
Adj. R2 0.1293 0.1352 0.1404 0. 1491 
Prob(f·statistic) 0.1211 0.1258 0.1323 0.1399 
N 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 
Panel B. Sales 
CAR[O;IO] CAR[0;10] CAR[0;20] CAR[0;20] 
Coefficient t -stat Coefficient t -stat Coefficient t -stat Coefficient t-stat 
c -0.0669 -3.69 *** -0.0694 -3.84 ••• -0.1287 -4.98 *** -0.1300 -5.09 *** 
NEWS ·0.0017 -0.14 0.0066 0.49 -0.0098 -0.56 0.0050 0.29 
NEWS*SUPERVISORY BOARD -0.0056 ·0.25 -0.0228 ·0.68 
NEWS*OTHER INSIDERS ·0.0276 -1.24 ·0.0228 ·0.75 
TRADING INTENSITY 0.3613 2.02 ** 0.3593 2.00 •• 0.8158 1.75 • 0.8098 1.74 * 
REPORTING_ DELAY 0.0004 1.04 0.0004 1.20 0.0008 1.32 0.0009 1.38 
MOMENTUM 0.0258 0.71 0.0255 0.70 0. 1025 1.84 * 0. 1020 1.83 * 
NUMBER_ Of_ TRADERS 0.0152 1.27 0.0163 1.34 0.0236 1.91 * 0.0237 1.91 * 
LEGISLATION 0.0262 2.47 ** 0.0276 2.60 *** 0.0342 2.21 ** 0.0351 2.28 ** 
SIZE 0.002 1 0.37 0.0024 0.43 0.0143 1.86 . 0.0143 1.82 * 
PENNY STOCK 0.0143 0.37 0.0 131 0.34 0.1571 2.53 •• 0. 1580 2.56 ** 
PRICE TO BOOK -0.0059 -1.43 ·0.0056 -1.41 -0.0017 ·0.28 ·0.00 14 ·0.24 
FREEFLOAT 0.0003 1.19 0.0003 1.18 0.0000 0.10 0.0001 0.13 
BLOCKHOLDER 0.0174 1.33 0.0165 1.25 0.0116 0.66 0.0113 0.63 
SUPERVISORY BOARD_SIZE 0.001 3 0.84 0.0012 0.76 0.00 14 0.67 0.0016 0.74 
EXECUTIVE BOARD_STZE -0.0002 -0.05 -0.0005 -0.10 -0.0086 -1 .39 -0.0090 -1.46 
Adj . R2 0.0247 0.0256 0.0806 0.08 11 
Prob(f -statistic) 0.0144 0.0138 0.0709 0.0699 
N 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 
This table shows results based on multivariate OLS regressions ofCAR[o;w] and CAR[o;2o] on potential determinants. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: (i) NEWS is a dummy variables which equals one if a transaction is succeeded by an ad-hoc news disclosure in the 20 trading days 
subsequent to the day of insider trading and zero otherwise. (ii) SUPERVISORY BOARD takes on the value of one if the insider is a member of the 
supervisory board and zero otherwise. (iii) OTHER INSIDERS, which takes on the value of one if the insider is a member of the group of other insiders 
and zero otherwise. (iv) TRADING_INTENSITYis defined as the trading volume of the respective transaction divided by the market value of the firm 
on the trading day. (v) REPORTING_DEIAY counts the number of days between the trading day and the repmting day. (vi) MOMENTUM measures 
the cumulative abnormal return prior to the trading day CAR[-20;-1]. (vii) MULTIPLE_ TRADERS is a dummy variable which equals one if more than 
one insider traded the stock on the same day and zero otherwise. (viii) LEGISlATION equals one if the transaction takes place after the reform of 
insider b·ading regulations on October 30, 2004, and zero otherwise. (ix) SIZE equals the natura/ logarithm of the market capitalization of a firm at 
the beginning of the respective calendar· year. (x) PENNY_ STOCK equals one if the respective stock is traded at a price below one euro at the day of the 
transaction and zero otherwise. (xi) PRICE_ TO_ BOOK equals the market value compared to the book value of afimi at the beginning of the respective 
calendar year. (xii) FREEFLOAT quantifies the fraction of shares in the free float. (xiii) BWCKHOLDER equals one if the respective company has a 
majority shareholder and zero otherwise. (xiv)SUPERVISORY_ BOARD_SIZE and EXECUTIVE_BOARD_SIZE quantify the number of board mem-
bers in each board. <->*,<·<;*indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, w %-level (two- tailed test). The problem ofheteroscedasticity (revealed via 
the White heteroscedasticity test) is solved by employing robust standard errors (White heteroscedasticity - consistent standard errors). 
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As displayed in Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is significant for this short pe-
riod [0;+10] implying that other insider earn more 
with front-running transactions compared to mem-
bers of the executive board. Again, the sum of the 
coefficient on NEWS and the interaction term 
NEWS*OTHER INSIDERS measures the profit 
compared to no news transactions. For the short 
period, this number shows to be significant on the 
s% -level, while the effect is not statistically signifi-
cant for the longer event window. 
Regarding sales transactions, multivariate regres-
sion results confirm the fmding that no specific 
group of insiders seems to be severely engaged in 
exploiting inside information. In particular, multi-
variate regression results on the sell side show that 
profits of insiders are not positively affected by a 
potential exploitation of inside information. 
5· Concluding Remarks 
Our study analyzes a large sample of corporate in-
sider transactions reported to the German supervi-
sory authority BaFin in the period July 1, 2002 to 
April 30, 2005 using event study methodology. In 
particular, we focus on the question whether corpo-
rate insiders seem to exploit inside information 
while trading in company's stock. Our findings re-
veal that corporate insiders are able to identify prof-
itable investment situations in their firms. E.g., they 
earn a mean profit of more than four percent in the 
20 trading days after they purchase company's 
stock. We thereby confirm findings of previous stud-
ies that insiders' profits for the German market are 
higher than for the corresponding markets in the US 
or UK. Furthermore, we find evidence that corpo-
rate insiders seem to be engaged in the exploitation 
of inside information as they earn above average 
profits by front-running on corporate news. Finally, 
looking at the type of insider, we find that members 
of the supervisory board (directors) and the group of 
other insiders (basically family members of senior 
managers and directors) are the ones which profit 
largely by front-running on corporate news. In con-
trast, members of the executive board (senior man-
agers) do not seem to exploit inside information 
according to our criterion as they do not realize 
superior returns with their rare front-running 
transactions. 
However, executive managers cannot be entirely 
exculpated by our study. One has to keep in mind 
that executive managers decide upon which impor-
tant corporate news qualify as ad-hoc news and thus 
have to be revealed to the market. In addition, they 
might also be able to have some influence concern-
ing the timing of the release. This potential discre-
tionary power can, however, only be exercised for 
unscheduled ad-hoc news like merger announce-
ments or a changes in the executive board. For 
scheduled ad-hoc news like (quarterly) earnings 
announcements, executive management lacks dis-
cretionary power to time or suppress an ad-hoc 
disclosure. Consequently, our finding that executive 
insiders trade less frequently prior to ad-hoc news 
announcements and that they do not earn excep-
tional profits with their front-running transactions 
might be connected to their potential discretionary 
power concerning ad-hoc releases for unscheduled 
ad-hoc news.22 If one believes in the discretionary 
power to cheat on unscheduled ad-hoc news re-
leases, one would find some evidence for this inter-
pretation in our data. In particular, executive man-
agers earn a profit of 4.80% on the buy side with 
those transactions not succeeded by an ad-hoc news 
release. Compared to the respective numbers for 
directors (1.81%) and other insiders (2.12%), man-
agers yield high profits. Thus, these high profits 
might be triggered by an omitted or at least delayed 
release of inside information via an ad-hoc an-
nouncement. However, it could also be triggered by 
intense mimicking trades of outside investors, who 
assume members of the executive board to have 
more valuable information than the two remaining 
groups of corporate insiders. 
Admittedly, our database might not be the ideal 
sample to study illegal insider trading. This is be-
cause intentional and offensive trading on inside 
information might not be reported to the supervi-
sory authority. In fact, corporate insiders are often 
suspected not to trade on their own account but 
giving hints to close friends which trade on their 
behalf. Given this consideration, we find it interest-
ing that insiders earn high profits with those trans-
actions which they consider to be unproblematic 
and thus report. Our results suggest watching trad-
ing records of corporate insiders closely; especially 
those trades which are shortly succeeded by an ad-
hoc news announcement. According to our findings, 
those insiders (e.g., the group of other insiders) who 
22 The proportion of scheduled (earnings announcements) and 
unscheduled ad-hoc news (remaining announcements) is rather 
balanced. For purchases 151 announcements are scheduled while 
156 are unscheduled. 
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are not in the spotlight of the public or the financial 
press do not seem to fear the scrutiny of the regula-
tor as they earn high profits trading shortly prior to 
ad-hoc disclosures. Therefore, the BaFin might 
think about intensifying its monitoring activities as 
well as its ability to impose sanctions to ensure 
market transparency and integrity of the German 
capital market. Nevertheless, we also see the ball in 
the court of the firms themselves. They have to pro-
tect their insiders from allegations, justified or un-
justified, by establishing voluntary commitments 
like blackout periods or trading bans prior to spe-
cific corporate events. 
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